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WAS THE FROG PRINCE SEXUALLY
MOLESTED?:
A REVIEW OF PETER WESTEN'S
THE LOGIC OF CONSENT
Heidi M. Hurd*
THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF
CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT. By Peter Westen.
Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Co. 2004. Pp. vii, 383. $104.95.
Peter Westen's The Logic of Consent1 is nothing short of a tour de
force. In the tradition of the very best and most significant
contributions to legal theory, Professor Westen demonstrates that we
do not know what we think we know about a capacity that on a daily
basis turns trespasses into dinner parties, brutal batteries into football
games, rape into lovemaking, and the commercial appropriation of
name and likeness into biography.2 While we all employ claims of
consent in everyday moral gossip to absolve some and withhold
sympathy from others, and while courts of law across the nation
commonly predicate legal rights and responsibilities on findings of
consent or its absence, Professor Westen convincingly proves that (1)
we do not share, either individually or institutionally, a common
concept of consent; (2) a number of the competing conceptions of
consent that are regularly employed (sometimes simultaneously by the
same person or court) are either, in themselves, conceptually
incoherent, or are frequently combined in ways that produce
conceptual confusion; and (3) our failure to sort out our conceptual
confusions results in gross injustices and inequities as we punish the
innocent and acquit the guilty.
Frankly speaking, when one agrees to review a book one privately
hopes for two things: that the book will not offer so many points of
disagreement as to make one's review feel like a remedial exercise
(giving rise to the "so many confusions, so little time" response); and
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that it will offer enough points of disagreement to provide one with
grounds for serious debate with the author. If I have one
disappointment with Professor Westen's marvelous book, it is that I
can find too little with which to disagree! And this is a book of
sufficient philosophical daring to deserve more feisty debate than I
find myself able to muster.
Professor Westen's enterprise is to elucidate the distinctly separate
empirical and normative components of legally-effective consent and
to demonstrate how confusions of these components have resulted in
morally unjustified legal judgments. Consider Professor Westen's
opening example of twenty-fiye-year-old Elizabeth Wilson, who
awoke in the middle of a September night in 1992 to find that a total
stranger, Joel Valdez, had broken into her Texas apartment and was
advancing on her with a knife. She leapt from her bed and fled to the
bathroom, but Valdez broke down the door and demanded that she
pull down his pants. Fearing both that she would be stabbed if she
resisted, and that she would contract AIDS if he forced her into the
unprotected intercourse that he made clear was his purpose, Wilson
agreed to submit to sexual intercourse if Valdez put on a condom. He
did so, and then subjected her to intercourse for an hour before she
was able to escape from his clutches and flee naked to the aid of a
neighbor. Without explanation, the grand jury refused to indict Valdez
for rape, though an unnamed participant later stated that several
members of the grand jury believed that the apparent bargain Wilson
struck with Valdez constituted consent on her part.3
As Professor Westen suggests, such a finding is only plausibly
explained if one assumes that the grand jury confused factual consent
with legal consent, mistaking true acquiescence by Wilson (that is, an
all-things-considered choice to submit to intercourse with Valdez),
with that amalgam of conditions that are indivi clpally necessary and
only jointly sufficient for a genuine justification on the part of Valdez
(that is, subjective acquiescence by Wilson under circumstances in
which her rational capacities were fully intact, she was armed with
adequate information, and she was sufficiently free to have
meaningfully chosen otherwise) (pp. 2, 9-10). Only a finding of legal
consent could properly have absolved Valdez of blame and rightly
insulated him from legal consequences, and inasmuch as it seems clear
that Wilson's choice - albeit an autonomous and fully informed one
- was hardly made under circumstances of adequate freedom, the
grand jury could not have fairly said that her factual consent satisfied
the requirements of legal consent.

3. Pp. 1-2; Ross E. Milloy, Furor Over a Decision Not to Indict in a Rape Case, N.Y.
Oct. 25, 1992, at 30; No Bill in Rape Case Prompts Outrage; Suspect Wore a Condom
at Woman's Request, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 10 1992, at 30.
TIMES,
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The Wilson case nicely motivates one of the principal themes that
runs through Professor Westen's sophisticated analysis of consent the claim that juries and judges often confuse a finding of a
complainant's "factual consent" (which, at its core, constitutes a state
of subjective acquiescence to what would be a rights violation in the
absence of such acquiescence, and which is generally a necessary,
though not sufficient, means of according another a justification for
action) with her "legal consent" (which varies in its requirements from
one jurisdiction to the next, but which requires sufficient knowledge,
rational capacity, and freedom as to make the defendant's behavior
toward the complainant justified, and hence, not a rights violation).
Part I of his book is dedicated to an analysis of what he terms "factual
consent." Part II is then devoted to analyzing the further conditions
that must be present before factual consent will provide another with a
legal justification for a prima fade rights violation. Part III concludes
the book by revisiting decisions and doctrines previously discussed in
the text so as to summarize ways in which courts have perpetrated and
perpetuated doctrinal confusions by conflating concepts of factual
consent with concepts of legal consent. Because Part III largely
summarizes the principal themes that animate Parts I and II, I shall
focus my energies here on the first two parts of his book.
In Chapter One, Professor Westen articulates the conditions of
what he calls "attitudinal consent," which as he says is "central to all
conceptions of consent," both factual and legal (p. 51). When the law
concerns itself with an offense to which consent is a defense, it
recognizes that subjective acquiescence has the capacity (under the
right conditions) to eliminate the wrongdoing addressed by the
offense. In words from my past, rather than in Professor Westen's
words, subjective acquiescence has the potential to be "morally
magical" - it can transform a wrong into a right when it constitutes an
autonomous exercise of will that conveys a permission on another that
he would not otherwise have.4 Inasmuch as an autonomous willing or
choice is a subjective mental state, so consent must consist of a
subjective mental state if its normative power is to derive from its
instantiation of autonomy.
As Professor Westen maintains, mental states of choosing can take
several alternative forms, any one of which will suffice to constitute
factual attitudinal consent (p. 53).
[I] t is enough that a person possess an unconditional desire for x. It is
also enough that a person possess a decided preference for x under the
circumstances - that is, a desire for x, all things considered. It can also
be enough that a person be so indifferent to x as to be willing to leave it

4. Hurd, supra note 2, at 124-25.
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to others as to whether x occurs. (p. 53)

As Professor Westen spends time making clear, one cannot satisfy
these requirements without an appreciation of the nature and quality
of x and without the capacity to assess one's desires and the ability of x
to satisfy them. Thus, a woman who acquiesces to penetration
believing herself to be having a gynecological examination does not
consent to sexual intercourse.5
But Professor Westen powerfully maintains in his opening chapter
that "a person can subjectively choose x as that which she desires for
herself under the circumstances even if she has no control over
whether x occurs, and even if she would not choose x but for the
circumstances in which she finds herself' (p. 53). And crucially, when
a person does subjectively choose x as that which she desires for
herself under the circumstances, all things considered, she factually
consents to it (even if she does not legally consent to it). Thus, when
Wilson submitted to sexual intercourse with Valdez as a means of
preventing him from stabbing her, Professor Westen maintains that
she factually consented to intercourse, because she subjectively chose
it over what she believed to be the alternatives, and the fact that she
could not have prevented him from having intercourse with her does
not make her choice to engage in it something less than factual
attitudinal consent.
Professor Westen takes pains to remind his readers throughout his
chapters on factual consent that a finding of factual consent does not
exhaust the question of whether there was legal consent, for while
factual attitudinal consent is a core requirement for legal consent, it is
not sufficient for legal consent, and hence, we need not fear that in
saying that Wilson factually consented to intercourse we are
simultaneously saying that she was not raped. Still, I want to take issue
with the defining claim that Professor Westen introduces in Chapter
One that a woman who knowingly and in full possession of her
rational capacities acquiesces to intercourse at gunpoint gives anything
that should be thought of as "consent." I want to suggest, instead, that
coerced consent is no consent at all.
Professor Westen defends the conceptual integrity of the notion of
factual consent by arguing that it alone captures the difference
between the woman who fights to the bitter end to defend against
forced penetration and the woman who acquiesces to it because she
holds her bodily integrity less dear than something else - e.g., her life,
her property, the lives of loved ones, etc. And while there may be no
5. Pp. 39, 41; see also McNair v. Nevada, 825 P.2d 571 (Nev. 1992) (concerning a woman
who consented to a gynecological examination, but who later discovered that she had been
subjected to intercourse); New York v. Hough, 607 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1994)
(concerning a woman who consented to intercourse with a man who turned out to be the
identical twin of her boyfriend, to whom she thought she had given consent).
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moral difference between one who achieves intercourse through force
and one who achieves it through threats, Professor Westen insists that
we have reason to want to preserve the conceptual distinction between
the mental states of these victims, and hence, to admit that the one
who was overpowered gave no consent, while the one who struck a
deal with the devil, did so consensually (albeit not with sufficient
freedom to provide a legal justification to her aggressor) (pp. 48-49).
But what reason can Professor Westen give for wanting to preserve
the conceptual distinction between the mental states of these victims?
Nothing turns on the distinction between these two kinds of victims.
Perhaps in days gone by, when the value of a woman's virtue was
elevated above the value of her life, the choice to preserve life at the
cost of virtue had significant moral ramifications: the woman who
succumbed at knife point could be deemed of lesser moral fiber than
the woman who fought to the death to protect her honor. But in this
day and age we properly draw no moral distinction between one who
risks death to protect her bodily integrity and one who sacrifices her
bodily integrity as a means of saving her life. So what value derives
from treating coerced acquiescence as a species of consent? I can think
of none that is not anachronistic.
I would suggest, instead, that we ought to reserve the concept of
consent for instances in which a person's acquiescence alters the moral
rights and obligations of another, rendering what would otherwise be
morally wrong a matter of moral right. Thus, a woman who acquiesces
at knife point in no sense accords her assailant a moral right to subject
her to sexual intercourse, and hence, she does nothing that ought to be
thought of as giving consent.
Now if one reserves the concept of consent for instances in which
persons alter the moral rights and duties of others, Professor Westen
may still have grounds for suggesting that the law ought sometimes to
require more than does morality, and, indeed, that it ought sometimes
to part ways with morality altogether. He might argue that
jurisdictions plausibly distinguish legal consent from moral consent,
for they are wary about allowing defendants to claim consent as a
defense to legally prohibited conduct without requiring them to meet
elevated evidentiary standards and, perhaps, elevated standards of
freedom and rationality on the part of their complainants. Or,
inversely, jurisdictions might legitimately acquit defendants who have
in fact invaded others' interests without their moral consent in
circumstances in which such defendants had good grounds to believe
that they had secured such consent.
Thus, for example, one can imagine a man subjecting a woman to
intercourse under circumstances in which she was willing and eager,
but in which he did not have adequate objective proof of her mental
state. We might say that he did her no moral wrong, given that she, in
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fact, subjectively willed that they have intercourse, but that he should
be thought guilty of a legal wrong, for he was consciously aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that she was not, in fact, choosing his
actions for herself. Thus, some courts and theorists might insist that he
should be held liable for reckless rape on the basis that her consent did
not satisfy necessary evidentiary standards for affording him a legal
defense. Professor Westen might thus argue that even if I am right in
thinking that the relevant distinction is not between factual consent
and legal consent, but between moral consent and legal consent, his
essential claim that the law's understanding of consent is uniquely
complex as compared to other relevant conceptions of consent
survives.
But I would argue, on the contrary, that a defendant who has
sexual intercourse with a woman who subjectively welcomes it but
who does nothing objective to manifest her desire, should at most be
guilty of attempted reckless rape.6 For while he was aware of the
possibility that she was not consenting, and so was culpable, the fact
that she was gladly choosing intercourse with him defeats the claim
that she was raped. I would thus suggest that the law is conceptually
confused when it torques the concept of consent in order to hold a
culpable defendant liable for something that was not, in fact, contrary
to the wants of another (assuming that other has the requisite
knowledge and capacity to know and execute her wants
autonomously). It should instead use attempt liability for this purpose,
for the doctrines of attempt liability were crafted precisely to allow for
the punishment of culpable persons who get lucky and in fact do no
wrong. And this is to say that the law has no good reason to part
company with morality in order fairly to deal with defendants who
have taken liberties with others in the absence of clear evidence of
consent.
Conversely, recall the case of O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co.,7 in
which a woman joined a line of newly-arrived immigrants who were
receiving smallpox vaccinations. When she held out her arm she did
not appreciate that she was going to receive an injection, and hence,
did not choose the doctor's conduct for herself. But the doctor, having
no reasonable basis for believing the immunization to be
nonconsensual, might properly be legally acquitted for what
constituted a true violation of her moral rights, given the absence on

6. In venturing this claim, I am aware of the dispute over whether it is not a
contradiction in terms to suggest that one can attempt crimes of recklessness. After all,
inasmuch as attempt liability requires proof of specific intent, it would seem inconsistent
with mere recklessness. I do not take an attempted reckless offense to be an oxymoron,
however; for conceptually, one can have as one's conscious object the doing of an action
under circumstances material to its criminality about which one is consciously aware.
7. 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891).
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her part of any choice to suffer such a contact. Many would say of him
that while he committed a prima facie battery, he had reasonable
grounds for believing his contact consensual, and thus, he ought to be
thought to have acted with legal justification.8 Professor Westen might
thus argue that just as the previous case demonstrates how the law
might plausibly withhold the defense of consent under circumstances
in which the complainant eagerly received the defendant's advances,
this case suggests that the law might plausibly accord a defendant the
defense of consent under circumstances in which the complainant did
not, in fact, choose his conduct for herself (and would have resisted it
if she had better understood its nature).
In fact, I would say that the physician in this case was merely
excused, rather than justified. I would reserve justifications for
instances in which no wrongs are done, leaving excuses to exonerate
persons from wrongs that were not culpably caused.9 This position has
the virtue of preserving justifications for circumstances in which we
applaud defendants' choices and would recommend their repetition if
we could turn back the clock. In a case in which we take a defendant
to have made the best choice possible given the information
reasonably available to him, but in which we come to appreciate that it
was the wrong choice, we best capture the judgment that history
should not be repeated by granting him an excuse, but not a
justification. Once again, then, I would suggest that to the extent that
the law parts ways with morality, it does so by virtue of confusing its
own categories. Rather than invoking the concept of justification to
achieve the exoneration of someone who nonculpably committed a
nonconsensual rights-violation, the law ought to employ the language
of excuse, thus leaving in tact the fundamental principle that prima
facie rights violations committed without consent are wrongful.
All this is to say that Professor Westen's core distinction between
factual consent and legal consent is, in my view, off the mark. For the
8. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (holding that
use of force is justified if an actor merely believes it to be immediately necessary); WAYNE
R. LAF AV E & AUSTIN w. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW§ 5.01 (2d ed. 1986) (recounting that
at common law, conduct is justified if an actor reasonably mistakes the existence of justifying
circumstances). In addition to capturing the jurisprudence of justification in a number of
jurisdictions, this "epistemic theory" has some very impressive academic champions. See,
e.g., Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law:
A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 U CLA L. REV. 61 (1984); Kent
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897
(1984).
9. See Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE
REV. 1551, 1557-62, 1565-72 (1999). While a minority position, this view certainly
has some worthy friends. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw §
10.1 (1978); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 122 (1984); George P.
Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269 (1974); Paul
H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1982).
DAME L.
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distinction between those who provide factual consent but not legal
consent (the woman who acquiesces at knife point) and those who do
not provide even factual consent (the woman who fights back until
physically overwhelmed) is a distinction without a difference. The
distinction that might make a difference (though I have argued against
even this) is the distinction between those whose consent provides a
moral defense but not a full legal defense and those whose conduct (I
do not say consent) is sufficient for a legal defense. For this distinction
would squarely raise the question of whether the law ought to punish
people who have done nothing morally wrongful; and acquit others
who have invaded moral rights without permission.
Professor Westen would surely respond by pointing out that the
confusions perpetrated by juries and judges take their inspiration from
a confusion of his distinction, not a confusion of my distinction. As his
opening recounting of the case of Elizabeth Wilson attests, the grand
jury seemed to assume that Ms. Wilson's acquiescence to intercourse
with Joel Valdez rendered such intercourse consensual for purposes of
rape law. Professor Westen would likely insist that the jury mistook
the relevance of acquiescence. It is not that they found her
acquiescence morally relevant, and then failed to appreciate that the
law sometimes does not mirror morality. They simply seemed to think
that acquiescence, by itself, settled the legal (and implicitly the moral)
question.
It may be that our disagreement is, in the end, largely semantic;
and that is how I took it when I first read through Professor Westen's
thoughtful and searching book. It may be that what he calls "factual
consent" I would call "acquiescence." Forced acquiescence is certainly
acquiescence, and perhaps it does no harm to call acquiescence
"factual consent" so long as one fully understands that acquiescence
(or factual consent) takes one a very short distance towards
determining whether someone has transferred to another a moral or
legal right. Given how persuasive Professor Westen is, however, in
establishing that juries and judges standardly confuse factual consent
with legal consent, I would much prefer to alter our discourse so as
never to use the term "consent" in circumstances in which it does not
connote that one has, in fact, given another a right to do what was
formerly wrong. Inasmuch as the confusions that Professor Westen is
at pains to unpack owe so much of their inspiration to over-use of the
term "consent," I would seek to li�it its application to instances in
which it at least does moral work (if not legal work), and hence, I
would say that persons who submit to others' conduct under
circumstances of ignorance, irrationality, or coercion do not consent to
that conduct; they merely acquiesce to it and that is, in itself, of no
moral or legal consequence.
In Chapter Two, Professor Westen takes up what he thinks of as a
second, alternative conception of factual consent that rivals the notion
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developed in Chapter One to the effect that consent is factually given
when one subjectively chooses another's conduct for herself. This
alternative conception is advanced by those who claim that one does
not factually consent unless and until one manifests one's subjective
acquiescence to another's behavior in ways that are overt and
observable. As David Archard puts it: "Consent is an act rather than a
state of mind. Consent is something I do rather than think or feel."10
Thus, a woman who is willing and eager for another's touch does not
consent to it unless she manifests her desire through action. One who
wakes to loving kisses has not consented to them, even if they are
welcome. To put it bluntly, Sleeping Beauty, Snow White, the Little
Mermaid, and the Frog Prince were all sexually molested! For while
their lives were returned to them by others who were willing to kiss
them despite their rather remarkable disabilities, their disabilities
made them unable to render those kisses consensual.
One might understand what I will call "the expressivist's position"
if, in fact, expressions of consent constituted what John Searle called
"declarations" - utterances the very uttering of which makes them
true or brings about a state of affairs.11 To say "I do" before an
ordained minister at the front of a chapel in the course of a marriage
ceremony is to marry, regardless of one's intentions or sentiments
about the matter. To say "you're out" as an umpire in a baseball game
is to put a player out, regardless of one's beliefs concerning the merits
of the call. To say "I resign" is to relinquish one's position, regardless
of whether one intends to be playing a prank or delivering a threat.
If by saying "I consent" (or an illocutionary equivalent) one
necessarily makes whatever follows on the part of another a
consensual deed, regardless of one's beliefs or sentiments concerning
the conduct, then we might understand why some, like Archard, might
insist that consent is an act, not a mental state. But there are two
things to say in response to those who take expressions of consent to
be declarations, one of which Professor Westen nicely captures, the
other of which is worth making clear. First, as Professor Westen
argues, "When S's utterance of 'yes' operates in law to constitute legal
consent, it is not despite what it represents about S's mental state, but
because of what it represents about her mental state - which is why it
10. P. 66 (quoting DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 4 (1998)); see also Joan
McGregor, Force, Cnnsent and the Reasonable Woman, in IN HARM'S WAY 231, 242 (Jules
L. Coleman & Allen E. Buchanan eds., 1994) (claiming that "[c]onsent is performative, it is
something that an agent does"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal
Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2181 (1995) (arguing that consent in the sexual context should
mirror "every other context-affirmative permission clearly signalled by words or conduct");
Emily Sherwin, Infelicitous Sex, 2 LEGAL THEORY 209, 217 (1996).
11.
SPEECH

JOHN
ACTS

R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION
1-8, 12-20 (1979).

AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF
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is commonly and rightly observed, 'Yes does not always mean yes'" (p.
91). Second, even if one were to persist in maintaining that expressions
of consent are declarations the saying of which makes consensual the
deeds to which they apply, one would not have established that all
instances of consent are expressive. For even if the expression of
consent is sufficient for there to be consent, it may not be necessary for
there to be consent. That we can make another's deeds consensual
simply by saying that they are does not mean that we cannot make
them consensual in other ways; for example, by subjectively choosing
them for ourselves without external manifestation. Thus, it ultimately
does not help the expressivist's case very much to sign onto the claim
that expressions of consent are declarations - unless and until he can
convincingly defend the claim that consent is not consent unless it is
expressed. Let us further explore these two objections to the
expressivist's understanding of consent.
It would seem that one who declares consent to be an act rather
than a mental state has two related problems to solve on pain of his
thesis being manifestly false: not all "yes's" would seem to be "yes's,"
and not all "no's" would seem to be "no's." A person suffering from
Tourette's Syndrome might be heard to exclaim "yes" in response to
another when her utterance was wholly involuntary. A speaker just
learning English might misremember the word "no," inverting its
spelling in her head and crying out "on, on" rather than "no, no." An
immigrant woman might believe that in holding out her arm in an
immunization line-up she is going to get a stamp, not an injection. On
pain of absurdity, expressivists would have to admit that while these
cases all reflect acts of apparent acquiescence, their status is merely
apparent. One might want to forgive those who relied upon such acts
if they had no reason to know that such acts were involuntary or
motivated by error in the ways I have described, but as I argued
above, crediting them with innocent mistakes ought not to be confused
with finding them in the right.
While it seems obvious that expressions of "yes" do not function as
declarations that necessarily make others' deeds consensual, Professor
Westen's second chapter reveals that many expressivists would
embrace an asymmetrical theory of factual expressive consent. They
would argue that while a "yes" may not be sufficient for consent, it is
nevertheless at least necessary. But I join Professor Westen in thinking
that there are clear cases in which consent is present even though
there has been no manifestation of it, and more strongly, even though
a clear "no" has been registered. To insist that consent is an act is to
insist that those who cannot act cannot consent. But does one really
want to maintain that mute quadriplegics lack not only the powers of
speech and locomotion but also the moral power to alter others' rights
and obligations by the exercise of their will? The only substantial
power they posses is the power of will, and it would be cruel indeed to
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declare that they cannot make others' touchings consensual simply by
welcoming them.12 Once again, of course, we might want to blame the
person who proceeds in the absence of any manifestation of consent
by one who is incapable of such a manifestation, but we ought not to
confuse our blame of one who substitutes hope (or indifference) for
knowledge with our understanding of when a prima facie rights
violation has, in fact, been licensed by a rights holder.
Some (now weak) expressivists might concede the argument so far,
and so might agree that "yes" is neither necessary nor sufficient for
consent. But, like Susan Estrich, they might continue to insist that at
the very least '"no' means no."13 Estrich is not silly about this: she well
appreciates, for example, that women sometimes say "no" during
moments of intimacy when they fervently hope that it will be ignored.
But she firmly believes that the law ought to treat a "no" as a
declaration that makes the conduct to which it applies nonconsensual,
regardless of the beliefs and desires of the parties involved. Like the
umpire who makes it so by declaring a player to have committed a
foul, so a woman renders her partner's actions nonconsensual by
delivering up a "no," even if she, like the unwitting umpire, was not
intending to bring the game to a halt.
Estrich may be right that the law ought always to treat an
expressed "no" as if it were a "no" in heart and mind. Evidentiary
concerns and the desire to use the law to impress upon persons the
importance of securing ex ante consent to what are prima facie rights
violations might be sufficient to justify the law in laying down a per se
rule that accords a "no" the status of a declaration that, by itself,
renders another's persistence nonconsensual. But such arguments
appear to be misplaced in this chapter, for they concern what the law
ought to build into the notion of legal consent, rather than what
constitutes Professor Westen's more primitive notion of factual
consent. Inasmuch as Professor Westen himself is anxious to remind
theorists of the need to divorce legal consent from factual consent, it is
puzzling that he treats Estrich's theory as a theory of factual consent,
for given how often a "no" is uttered by one who is willing, it is a very
poor theory of factual consent, and hence, if given its best
interpretation, it ought to be dealt w_ith as a theory of legal consent.
More generally, there is only one interpretation that can cure the
embarrassment to expressivism posed by cases that make clear that
persons can both satisfy its actus reus requirement without being a
willing recipient of another's overtures and fail to satisfy that

12. The fallacy, as Westen nicely puts it, "is the assumption that if conduct is involuntary
in the sense of being unpreventable, it must also be involuntary in the sense of being
unwelcomed." P. 228.
13. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986).
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requirement while welcoming another's conduct. It must be that
expressivists are advancing, not an empirical (or in Professor Westen's
terms, a factual) account of consent, but a normative theory about
how the law ought to define consent. They might plausibly believe, in
my lexicon, that only overt acts transfer rights and alter
responsibilities, and they thus might rightly reserve the term "consent"
for such morally magical events in the world. Motivated by the worry
that culpable defendants will be acquitted and nonculpable defendants
will be convicted if consent is deemed a subjective state, they urge
upon the law a definition that both exonerates those who _reasonably
rely upon what is ordinary evidence of consent and holds liable those
who are indifferent to the lack of such evidence (even when they get
lucky and do not offend another's wishes).
But as Professor Westen himself recognizes later in the book,
"defining consent as a mental state does not allow defendants . . . to
escape punishment altogether. . . . at least in jurisdictions that also
possess attempt statutes" (p. 161). Once again, we need not build into
the concept of consent all that is necessary to inculpate the guilty and
exculpate the innocent; for we have doctrines of attempt and doctrines
of excuse that are up to these tasks. The only thing that expressivists
might complain of, then, is that we do not punish attempts the same as
completions; but that is a general complaint with the jurisprudence of
attempt liability that ought to be advanced in its own right, and not in
the disguise of a discrete thesis about the justification of consent.
Given Professor Westen's own complaints with the expressivist's
theory of consent (and he has several other complaints beyond those
he shares with me, including very persuasive ones about how the
expressivist fixes the interpretive community that defines whether a
given action expresses consent), it is quite surprising that he dignifies
the theory of "factual expressive consent" as a genuine alternative to
the theory of "factual attitudinal consent" advanced in the first
chapter as "the core conception" of consent. While I appreciate that
Professor Westen is anxious to give a conceptual analysis of
understandings of consent in fact embraced by the law and leading
theorists, and while he certainly advances good authority in support of
his empirical claim that "factual expressive consent" enjoys substantial
doctrinal and scholarly support, I would have thought that the best
means of providing conceptual clarity would have been to show the
theory to be confused at its core, rather than to pick at the confusions
at its perimeter. As it stands, Professor Westen pays the expressivist's
theory the compliment of characterizing it as a rival to the
subjectivist's attitudinal theory; analyzes both theories separately;
plainly reveals and defends his conviction that the former is, as he
describes it, "the core conception of consent;" finds fault with the
latter conception; and then ultimately refuses to declare those who
advance an expressive theory of factual consent to be confused, thus

May 2005)

Was the Frog Prince Sexually Molested?

1341

committing himself to juggling both notions of factual consent
throughout the entire book as though the dispute between their
contenders is resistant to reasoned resolution.
In my humble view, Professor Westen should have had the courage
of his intuitions and should have gone the distance to establish that
those who inject an expressive requirement into the most primitive
conception of consent do so because they believe that our
understanding of consent must be constructed to answer the sorts of
concerns that might rightly make legal consent different from, and
more onerous than, mere acquiescence. But inasmuch as Professor
Westen's project is to demonstrate how our understanding of factual
consent need not (and implicitly, should not) capture all that legal
consent must capture, I would have thought that he would declare as
confused any concept of factual consent that smuggles in the concerns
reserved for legal consent which is the subject matter of Part Two.
In Part Two of his book, Professor Westen turns to the various
conceptions of consent employed by the law in defining the rights and
duties that will be protected and enforced by recourse to the powers of
the state. According to Professor Westen, "[l)egal conceptions of
consent . . . fall into two subsets that I shall call 'prescriptive' and
'imputed"' (p. 6). Prescriptive consent is factual consent that is
sufficiently competent, informed, and free to justify another in
committing a prima facie legal wrong. There are thus, in Professor
Westen's view, two possible sorts of prescriptive consent, answering to
the two sorts of factual consent that he unpacks in Part One of the
text: "prescriptive attitudinal consent," which "consists of an attitude
of factual acquiescence by S under conditions of a certain kind namely, such conditions of competence, knowledge, freedom, and
motivation to acquiesce as are deemed necessary to change S's legal
relationship to A" (p. 7); and "prescriptive expressive consent," which
consists of "an empirical expression of acquiescence by S in the
context of such apparent competence, knowledge, freedom, and
motivation to acquiesce as are deemed necessary to give the
expression legal effect" (p. 7).
In contrast to prescriptive consent, Professor Westen points out
that the various kinds of "imputed consent" do not incorporate claims
of factual consent: consent is imputed precisely when and because
none has been granted in fact. As he taxonomizes them, there are
three sorts of imputed consent. First, under what he calls "constructive
consent," a person's consent to xis constructively construed as consent
toy, wheny is, as an objective matter, a means to or an incident of x
(regardless of whether the person understood it as such). Thus, to use
his example, when an amateur hockey player consents to enter the
rink, he constructively consents to being cross-checked, despite the
fact that it constitutes a major foul under the rules and despite the fact
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that he may have never contemplated its possibility, for it is generally
known that such a rule violation is a common occurrence within the
game. Second, when one subjectively appreciates and assumes a risk,
one gives "informed consent" to the materialization of the risk. Thus,
a woman who breaks a leg while skiing can be thought to have given
informed consent to the injury, for she voluntarily encountered the
risk while fully informed and subjectively aware of the consequences
that would ensue from its materialization. Finally, when one would
have given prescriptive consent to x if one were competent to do so,
the law takes one to have "hypothetically consented" to x. Thus, the
law will take an unconscious accident victim to have hypothetically
consented to a blood transfusion if doctors reasonably believed that
she would have prescriptively consented to it had she been conscious
and able to assess her situation, so as to give factual consent to the
procedure under circumstances in which the law would afford her
doctors' a full justification.
Professor Westen's treatment of the species and genera of legal
consent is doctrinally rich, analytically rigorous, and philosophically
engaging. For page after page he works through the detailed
conceptual and normative claims that have to be defended before
these conceptions of consent can be thought coherent and consistent,
drawing on fascinating cases to supply intuition-priming examples.
Because I simply cannot do justice to this remarkably rich exploration
here, I am forced to do what I did with Part One and pick a single
sampling from the intellectual feast that comprises the great middle
part of his book.
Consider, then, Professor Westen's discussion of "informed
consent." As Professor Westen describes it, "[t]he fiction is that
because persons prescriptively acquiesce to risks of x, they also
prescriptively acquiesce to x itself' (p. 283). To use his example, a
woman who prefers the small risk of blindness to the alternative of
continuing to have impaired vision will be thought to have given
informed consent to her laser surgeon's blinding of her, when the risk
materializes despite due care on the part of the surgeon (p. 281). The
virtue of this fiction, says Professor Westen, is that it "signal[s] what
assumption-of-risk rules possess in common with rules of prescriptive
consent" (p. 284). As he elaborates:

Both rules enhance S's autonomy to submit to conduct on A's part by
immunizing A from criminal liability for harm, x, that A inflicts upon S in
the course of his conduct: rules of prescriptive consent enhance S's
autonomy to choose conduct that involves a certainty of harm x, while
assumption-of-risk rules enhance S's autonomy to choose conduct that
involves a mere risk of x without immunizing A from liability for x in the
event the latter ensures, framing S's assumption of risk of x as a fiction of
consent to x expresses the sense in which by legally choosing to engage in
conduct involving a risk of x, S also legally chooses x. (p. 284)
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I would suggest that while the assumption of a risk has "moral magic"
that makes it a cousin to consent, there are significant dissimilarities
between the two concepts, and a host of conceptual and normative
problems attendant upon the one (assumption of risk) that do not
beset the other (consent). Inasmuch as the concept of assumption of
risk (or informed consent) is one of the least developed in Professor
Westen's text, and inasmuch as it glosses over significant and
interesting questions to declare assumption of risk a species of (legally
imputed) consent, let me lay out the differences between the concepts
that have moral and legal implications.
There appear two distinct ways in which a person's moral agency
can be used to alter the morality of another person's actions. First, it
can function to fully transform the morality of another's conduct - to
make an action right when it would otherwise be wrong. For example,
consent turns an assault into a handshake, a trespass into a barbeque,
and a kidnapping into a Sunday drive. Second, a person can exercise
moral agency in a manner that generates a permission that allows
another to do a wrong act. Such a permission does not morally
transform a wrong act into a right act, but it grants another a right to
do wrong. It conveys a "stained permission," for the act done remains,
in some sense, wrong, and hence, morally stained, but the permission
defeats any rights on the part of others that the actor not do the wrong
act. Consider, for example, a woman who prefers to avoid motherhood
by having successive abortions, rather than by using birth control.
Suppose that her doctor has repeatedly tried to induce her to abandon
this strategy, but, in the face of her refusal to do so, he has continued
to perform abortions whenever she finds herself pregnant. Even the
most committed pro-choice advocates can condemn the woman's
choice to substitute abortion for birth control, for they can judge her
wrong to prefer her own freedom from trivial inconveniences to the
genuine interests that can be attributed to fetuses. Nevertheless, if
such pro-choice advocates are right in thinking that the liberty
interests possessed by such a woman outweigh the interests of the
fetuses she seeks to abort, then they must admit that her consent to
the abortions makes her doctor's successive procedures morally
permissible.14
Many courts have reasoned that the assumption of a risk is either
fully morally transformative, making morally justified what would
otherwise be unjustified; or is itself blameworthy, and so a species of
an altogether different defense in law - e.g., contributory negligence
- and not morally transformative in the least. Thus, for example, in

14. For an extensive discussion of how wrongs can be right (in the sense of permitted)
while still being wrongs, see Heidi M. Hurd, Duties Beyond the Call of Duty, 6 ANN. REV. OF
LAW & ETHICS 3 (1998); Heidi M. Hurd, Liberty in Law, 21 LAW & PHIL. 385 (2002).
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the court declared that
the doctrine of assumption of risk cannot be thought to be an
autonomous defense in torts. As the court argued, a plaintiff's
assumption of a risk inevitably entails either that the defendant was in
no manner negligent in imposing the risk (making it impossible for the
plaintiff even to make out the prima facie case for negligence because
of an inability to prove a breach of duty on the defendant's part), or
entails that the plaintiff was herself negligent in assuming what was, ex
hypothesi, a negligently imposed risk. The court described the first
understanding as "primary assumption of risk" and the second as
"secondary assumption of risk," and argued that there remains no
conceptual room for a doctrine that exonerates a negligent defendant
from blame without relying on negligence on the plaintiff's part.
I think that this is wrong. It seems to me that it is possible for
persons to non-negligently assume risks negligently imposed by others,
and when they do so, they give others stained permissions to do what
it is, ex hypothesi, wrong to do. That it is possible to non-negligently
assume a negligently imposed risk follows from the thesis that the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of an action turns on the costs
and benefits of that action as judged from the epistemic vantage point
of the actor. Thus, to use the facts of Meistrich in illustration, it may
have been negligent of the ice rink owner to maintain ice that was too
hard for ordinary skaters, but it may have been non-negligent of the
plaintiff to have skated on the ice, given the costs to him of forgoing
his practice. Under such circumstances, his willingness to encounter
the increased risks of particularly hard ice did not make having such
ice non-negligent; and it did not make him negligent in skating on it;
but it did convey a stained permission to the rink owner that
foreclosed any further right on his part to complain about the ice, or
the consequences of the fall that inevitably transpired.
By capturing how assumption of risk can plausibly alter the rights
and obligations of others without collapsing into contributory
negligence I have sought to vindicate Professor Westen's intuition that
assumption of risk is at least akin to, if not a species of, consent. Given
that fictions are just that, I am not a fan of their use, and I would thus
have resisted the temptation to characterize assumption of risk as
"imputed consent," for it is not that the law pretends that assumption
of risk is a form of consent; it is that assumption of risk has its own
moral power - a power akin to, but not the same as, consent (namely
the power to generate stained permissions) - and the law simply
mirrors morality when it recognizes it as a legal defense.
But while assumption of risk is an analogue to consent in its ability
to alter others' rights and duties, it is a nettlesome concept that

15. 155 A.2d 90 (N.J. 1959).
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persistently defies attempts to specify its conditions. As Professor
Westen recognizes and discusses only briefly, the conditions under
which persons will be thought to assume risks of others' wrongs are
contested. "First, an imputation of consent by S rests upon a
normative judgment that the risk of which S is conscious is a risk that
persons are justified in taking" (p. 283). Some risks are deemed too
risky to assume in light of their social (dis-) utility. "[N]o jurisdiction
allows persons to assume the risks of serious bodily injury involved in
street fighting because no jurisdiction sees any social value in street
brawls. On the other hand, every jurisdiction sees enough social value
in competitive boxing .. . to allow persons to assume the risk of
assault" (p. 283; footnotes omitted). Second, determinations of
informed consent "rest upon normative judgments as to the amount of
information that S must possess about a risk if S's decision to face the
risk is to constitute a defense to A in the event the risk materializes (p.
283). Thus, as Professor Westen argues, medical patients who are
contemplating life-threatening surgery are likely to be entitled to more
detailed information about the risks of death than persons exposed to
HIV through sexual intercourse. And, third, Professor Westen might
have added that just as one cannot assume a risk without having an
informed appreciation of its significance, so one's assumption of a risk
must be sufficiently free to make it "one's own." Thus, while the
doctrine of assumption of risk was a child of the Industrial Revolution,
coined as a means of protecting employers from suits by employees
who had gravitated to the cities to take up often dangerous tasks in
relatively unprotected settings, it came to be criticized in that doctrinal
arena precisely because it was understood that employees could not
meaningfully simply leave their jobs every time they identified an
unreasonable risk.
Now fixing the conditions of the legitimacy of a risk, the adequacy
of information concerning that risk, and the voluntariness with which
someone confronts a risk are thorny matters. One might think them
no more thorny than those that beset claims of consent, but there are
substantial differences. Consider the woman who wears a low cut tight
red dress to a notoriously rough bar on a Friday night. Does she
assume the risk of rape, and so give her rapist a stained permission to
subject her to forced intercourse? After all, wearing what one wants
where one wants would seem of considerable social value.And we can
imagine that her knowledge of the risk is perfect: she understands
precisely the perirshe courts.And nothing about her decision to spend
a Friday night at that bar is in any way coerced or less than fully
voluntary. So it would seem that she assumes the risk of rape. But
surely we do not want to suggest that in wearing deliberately
provocative clothing to a bar, a woman transfers away her right to
bodily integrity. The same problem rears its head in countless settings.
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One who drives to the grocery store late on New Year's Eve to buy
snacks clearly does something that is prima facie socially legitimate;
fully appreciates the very substantial risk of being hit by a drunk
driver; and encounters that risk entirely voluntarily. Do we want to say
that such a person conveys a stained permission to a drunk driver to
collide with him? In the same vein, can we stomach the conclusion that
a runner who heads through Central Park at dusk is voluntarily and
knowingly assuming the risk of being mugged in a manner that gives
his assailant a legitimate defense?
As all of these examples demonstrate, there is a substantial
difference between the scope of a consent defense and the scope of an
assumption of risk defense, and unless and until we can sort out why
women who dress provocatively do not assume the risk of rape while
hockey players who enter an amateur game assume the risk of being
cross-checked, we will not be in a position to specify when and why
the law ought to impute consent or otherwise transfer losses to
persons who assume the risk of others' wrongdoing. Inasmuch as the
criteria for informed consent discussed by Professor Westen do not do
the work to sort between hockey players and skiers on one hand and
provocatively dressed women and joggers in Central Park on the
other, we cannot be confident that informed consent is a conceptually
coherent and normatively defensible defense, and we thus cannot be
confident that it should be counted as a moral or doctrinal cousin of
consent.
That Professor Westen leaves for later work both conceptual
vagaries and normative doubts is of small matter, given the
extraordinary depth and breadth of the analysis he provides. Professor
Westen's book is a sumptuous read, its pages brimming with lively
cases, colorful examples, and crisp analytic moves that reveal
entrenched doctrinal confusions. One finishes it with a sense of
breathlessness, as though one has finally come to a halt after the
professional analogue of an arduous hike through tremendously
interesting terrain. I recommend this hike to all who enjoy rigorous
intellectual workouts in areas fraught with conceptual obstacles and
rich in normative and doctrinal significance.

